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Note
Erosion of the Fifth Amendment Through the Use of
Defense Counsel as Witness
by
WAYNE R. GROSS*
Recently, in Arizona, a criminal defense attorney was required to
testify about his former client's competency to stand trial.1 In Penn-
sylvania, a criminal defense attorney was forced to reveal information
concerning the whereabouts of her client, who had violated conditions of
bail by failing to appear at trial. 2 The Second Circuit also recently held
that the government, without showing reasonable need, may compel an
attorney to testify against his client during a grand jury proceeding.
3
These three cases illustrate a disturbing trend toward the increased use of
defense counsel as witness against his client in both federal and state
criminal prosecutions, which threatens to seriously erode the protections
guaranteed a criminal defendant under the Bill of Rights. These protec-
tions are necessary to equalize the uneven balance of power between the
individual and the prosecutorial forces of the government.
This Note will show that the privilege against self-incrimination is
historically grounded in the American accusatorial system of criminal
justice and the guarantee that the state will prove its own case without
any assistance from the defendant. The use of defense counsel as witness
against the defendant violates that guarantee and undermines the accusa-
torial nature of our system of justice.
In coming to this conclusion, this Note first discusses the para-
mount purpose of the Bill of Rights: to limit the powers of government.
Section I analyzes the historical underpinnings of the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, concluding that the provision was in-
tended to limit the power of the government by creating and maintaining
an accusatorial system of justice. Section II analyzes the defense coun-
sel's vital role in maintaining the accusatorial system, illustrated by the
* Member, Third Year Class.
1. See Bishop v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 404, 724 P.2d 23 (1986) (en banc).
2. See Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 511 Pa. 112, 511 A.2d 1327 (1986).
3. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon John Doe, Esq., 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.
1985) (en bane), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986).
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Supreme Court's development of constitutional law regarding custodial
interrogations up to and including Miranda v. Arizona.4 Section III first
analyzes the recent limitations placed by the United States Supreme
Court upon the use of the privilege against self-incrimination, and then
argues that such limitations run counter to the historical underpinnings
of the privilege. Section III next presents the late Justice Black's inter-
pretation of the privilege, arguing that his model is more consistent with
the fifth amendment's historical underpinnings, and examines Califor-
nia's subsequent adoption of that model. Section III then briefly exam-
ines the attorney-client privilege and some of the problems that arise
when exceptions to the privilege allow the state to require defense coun-
sel to disclose information incriminating to the defendant. Against this
background, section IV then analyzes the three cases mentioned above,
which illustrate a growing trend toward the erosion of a defendant's pro-
tection under the Bill of Rights. Finally, section V presents a proposal
for interpretation of the fifth amendment that would better effectuate the
values underlying the privilege against self-incrimination.
I. The History of the Fifth Amendment Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination
When the Constitutional Convention adjourned in Philadelphia on
September 17, 1787, separate state conventions considered the Constitu-
tion without a Bill of Rights; many states, however, refused to ratify the
Constitution without the amendments.5 James Madison explained that
the Bill of Rights was intended "to limit and qualify the powers of Gov-
ernment, by excepting out of the grant of power those cases in which the
Government ought not to act, or to act only in a particular mode." 6
Those amendments governing the methods by which one was to be crimi-
nally prosecuted exemplify this intent. As Justice Black once noted,
the Framers were well aware of the awesome investigative and
prosecutorial powers of government and it was in order to limit those
powers that they spelled out in detail in the Constitution the procedure
to be followed in criminal trials. A defendant, they said, is entitled to
notice of the charges against him, trial by jury, the right to counsel for
his defense, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the
right to call witnesses in his own behalf, and the right not to be a
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 509-10 (1929) ("It was the assur-
ance that [a Bill of Rights] would be supplied by Amendments which made possible the ratifi-
cation of the Constitution by the necessary number of States in 1788.").
6. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (J. Gales ed. 1789). It was Madison who, in accordance
with the demands of the states which were otherwise reluctant to ratify the Constitution. intro-
duced the amendments to the Constitution embodying the Bill of Rights as soon as the First
Congress met. C. WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT 82-
83 (1925).
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witness against himself.7
Thus, the fifth amendment was one of a group of fights that the
Framers believed would restrain and limit the powers of government.
The historical roots of the fifth amendment provide the key to how the
privilege against self-incrimination, which provides that "[n]o person...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,"
limits the powers of government.
8
The American privilege against self-incrimination is derived from
English common law. In early seventeenth-century England, 9 all courts
administering criminal justice required the accused to answer when ques-
tioned.' 0 In the Court of Star Chamber, for example, the questioning
was prefaced by an admonition to the accused, in which he was ordered
to answer any questions asked of him, effectively forcing him to disclose
his own offenses.' 1 The church courts also used harsh inquisitorial pro-
cedures that included prying into matters of conscience and private mat-
ters of conduct, especially in sexual relations.' 2 Standard practice
included making suspects give evidence against themselves, and using
torture to compel the accused to speak.
13
It was in this judicial environment that a man called "Freeborn
John" Lilburne was haled before the Court of Star Chamber charged
with the crime of importing heretical and seditious books. Because he
refused to take an oath to answer truthfully, the Star Chamber "con-
demned him to be whipped and pilloried... and in 1638 the sentence was
carried out."'1 4 Lilburne, however, petitioned Parliament, claiming that
the court's actions were improper. The House of Commons agreed with
Lilburne and ordered an indemnity of 3,000 pounds to be paid to
7. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 111-12 (1970) (Black, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
8. I assume, as have some of the most influential justices ever to serve on the Supreme
Court, that the proper way to understand the scope of the fifth amendment is to examine its
history. In 1807, Chief Justice Marshall analyzed the privilege's history in the treason trial of
Aaron Burr. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38, 39 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14, 692e). In
1966, Chief Justice Warren examined its history in determining the privilege's applicability to
pretrial police interrogation in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458-59 (1966). Some schol-
ars, however, suggest that we should not look to the history of the privilege to interpret its
meaning today. See L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? 171-82
(1959); see also Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 33
UCLA L. REv. 1063, 1147-48 (1986).
9. Although Lewis Mayers suggests that "any review of earlier centuries would.., be of
purely antiquarian interest," L. MAYERS, supra note 8, at 9, see Wigmore, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination; Its History, 15 HARV. L. REv. 610, 610-12 (1902), for a brief but
informative discussion of earlier English history.
10. L. MAYERS, supra note 8, at 10.
1 1. Id. at 11.
12. Id. at 12.
13. E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 2 (1955).
14. Id. at 3.
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Lilburne. 15 This event-and the stir it created in the common law
courts-marked the origin of the privilege against self-incrimination in
the common law.16
When the English colonials settled in the new world, the opposition
to the inquisitorial system was great, particularly by the Puritan settlors
who were well aware of the rebellion of Lilburne. 17 The early law of the
American colonies reflected these sentiments. For example, article 45 of
the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641 provided in part that "[n]o
man shall be forced by Torture to confess any Crime against himself nor
any other. . .. " 18 After great struggle, i9 the privilege against self-incrim-
ination was implanted into the Bill of Rights to ensure that the system of
justice in the United States would be accusatorial, as opposed to inquisi-
torial. 20 In an accusatorial system, the government must accuse and
bear the burden of proving the guilt of a person for a crime. 21 Thus,
history indicates that the privilege against self-incrimination was in-
tended to limit the power of government by requiring it to maintain an
accusatorial system of justice.
II. The Role of the Sixth Amendment Right of Assistance of
Counsel in Maintaining the Accusatorial System: The
Interrogation and Confession Cases
The Framers intended the American system of criminal process to
be adversarial as well as accusatorial. 22 An adversarial system is one in
which opposing parties vie against each other for a result favorable to
15. Id.
16. Id.; see also Wigmore, supra note 9, at 632-34 (discussing consequences in common
law courts).
17. See Ulmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 446 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Pitt-
man, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in
America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763, 769-71 (1935).
18. MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES, art. 45 (1641), reprinted in 3 THE LAWS AND
LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1641-1691, at 695 (J. Cushing 1976). A total of seven Ameri-
can states guaranteed the privilege in their constitutions or bills of rights. Pittman, supra note
17, at 464-65.
19. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 459 (1966) (citing Pittman, supra note 17).
20. L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT at viii (1968) ("[T]he origins (of the
privilege) are related to the development of the accusatorial system of criminal justice and the
concept of fair trial; to the principle that fundamental law limits government-the very foun-
dation of constitutionalism."); see also D. NISSMAN, E. HAGEN & P. BROOKS, LAW OF CON-
FESSIONS § 2:4-:6, at 33-37 (1985) (attributing inclusion of the privilege in the Bill of Rights to
rejection of colonial inquisitional abuses, in addition to desire to prevent the new government
from abridging liberties created by individual states).
21. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 21 (5th ed. 1979).
22. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.6, at 23 (abridged ed.
1985) ("The advancement of an adversary system of adjudication clearly ranks among the
most significant process goals.").
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themselves, and a neutral trier of fact decides the case.23 The adversarial
system is safeguarded by the sixth amendment right to counsel2 4-a cor-
nerstone of the judicial system since the adoption of the federal Constitu-
tion and the Bill of Rights. 25 Justice Sutherland eloquently stated the
importance of this right long ago in the landmark case of Powell v.
Alabama:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent
and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of
law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining
for himself whether the indictment is good or bad .... Left without
the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the is-
sue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he [has] a perfect one.
He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceed-
ings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the
danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence.
26
The adversarial system of justice is furthered by defense counsel be-
cause he enables the accused to oppose the prosecution on equal terms.
Just as importantly, however, defense counsel helps to maintain the accu-
satorial system by ensuring that the state will bear the burden of proving
its own case.2 7 For example, by moving to strike inadmissible testimony,
defense counsel is not simply opposing the prosecution within the frame-
work of the adversarial system; he is forcing the state to prove within the
confines of the law of evidence that the accused is guilty, thereby main-
taining the accusatorial system.
The fifth and sixth amendments act in conjunction to fulfill both the
adversarial and accusatorial goals of the American criminal justice sys-
tem. It would be inaccurate and inconclusive, therefore, for a court to
consider only one of these fundamental rights when the case involves a
possible violation of both rights. As Judge Oakes stated:
The Bill [of Rights] cannot be construed merely taxanomically, as a set
of pigeonholes or preconceived rules into which a given factual situa-
tion does or does not fit. Rather it must be viewed as a whole; it is an
interlocking complex of basic principles of fairness and individual enti-
tlement that carries a continuing meaning [governing the relationship
23. Id.
24. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI; see W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 22, § 1.6 at 23.
25. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61-64 (1932).
26. Id. at 68-69.
27. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 22, § 1.6, at 25 ("The concepts of adversary
adjudication and accusatorial procedure complement each other.").
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between the individual and his or her government]. 28
The use of defense counsel as witness against the accused raises
questions under both the fifth and the sixth amendments, and the Court's
interpretation of those issues affects the entire system of criminal justice.
Thus, both the fifth and sixth amendments must be analyzed together to
determine whether the state constitutionally may require defense counsel
to testify against the accused.
The notion that the right to counsel protects the values underlying
the privilege against self-incrimination is not new. The development of
the constitutional limitations on police interrogations provides an impor-
tant example of the way in which the sixth amendment right to counsel
protects and fully effectuates the privilege against self-incrimination.
The Court struggled for many years to formulate a precise rule that
both police and judges could follow in determining the manner and ex-
tent to which the police may interrogate an accused. 29 The Court devel-
oped this rule in the landmark decision, Miranda v. Arizona, 30 basing its
decision upon fifth and sixth amendment principles. 31 A brief review of
the historical development of Miranda will provide a model of fifth and
sixth amendment jurisprudence that courts should employ in cases in
which prosecutors call defense counsel as witness against their own cli-
ent, the accused.
The Supreme Court triggered the first stage32 in the development of
the law governing confessions in Brown v. Mississippi. 33 Brown involved
police officers who had used brutal methods such as hanging and severe
whipping to obtain homicide confessions from three black defendants. 34
The Court found the confessions violated the fourteenth amendment due
process clause, using the "voluntariness" test-whether the "totality of
the circumstances that preceded the confessions" deprived the defendant
28. Oakes, The Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing the Bill of Rights, 54
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 922 (1979).
29. See Inbau, Police Interrogation-A Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY
& POLICE SCI. 16, 17-19 (1961).
30. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
31. Id. at 442. But see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1985). The Elstad Court
suggested that Miranda's exclusionary rule "sweeps more broadly than the fifth amendment
itself," creating an irrebuttable presumption that does not bar the use of a subsequently ob-
tained voluntary statement when there had been later compliance with Miranda. Id. The re-
strictive interpretation of Miranda by Elstad or other opinions in the future do not change the
importance of the Miranda decision and its analysis for the purpose of this Note, which is to
show how the fifth amendment privilege should be applied.
32. I refer to the various ways in which the Supreme Court has analyzed custodial inter-
rogations as "stages" only for the purpose of comparing the development of the Court's ap-
proach in this area with the way in which the Supreme Court has analyzed the use of defense
counsel as witness.
33. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
34. Id. at 281-82.
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of his "power of resistance. '3 5 After Brown, the Court decided roughly
thirty-five confession cases relying solely on the "voluntariness" test.
36
This test presented problems for the police, however, because it provided
no guidelines for acceptable police conduct. The rule also impaired the
effectiveness of judicial review because trial judges were left without a
clear rule for resolving confession claims and were thus forced to make
detailed fact-based decisions. These problems led the Court to look for
alternative means to deal with police interrogation abuses.
This first stage in the development of judge-made law governing
confessions bears some resemblance to present law applicable to the use
of defense counsel as witness. The privilege against self-incrimination
was not invoked in confession cases at this early stage because the fifth
amendment had not yet been extended to the states.37 More importantly,
the privilege was not invoked because it had not yet been applied to un-
sworn statements obtained by station-house interrogation-only legal
compulsion to testify, not the physical or psychological compulsion fac-
ing the accused at the station-house, could invoke the privilege.38 Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court has refused to apply the privilege against self-
incrimination to defense counsel used as a witness by the state, because
compulsion to testify means personal compulsion.
39
The second stage began in Massiah v. United States,4° when the
Supreme Court first deviated from the voluntariness standard in confes-
sion cases. 41 In Massiah, the accused, while free on bail, met with a code-
fendant who engaged the accused in a conversation in which he made
damaging admissions. The codefendent, cooperating with the authorities,
transmitted the entire conversation by radio to nearby agents. 42 Later, a
federal agent who had listened to the conversation testified at Massiah's
35. See Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197-98 (1957).
36. B. GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES
260-61 (1973).
37. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964). The fifth amendment is now fully applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment due process clause. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 80.
38. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 22, § 6.5 at 283. Legal compulsion means
threatening one with the crime of perjury for testifying falsely or with contempt for refusing to
testify at all. Because custodial interrogation entailed physical compulsion, the privilege
against self-incrimination was believed not to apply. Id.
39. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397-98 (1976).
40. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
41. The Supreme Court had earlier developed the McNabb-Mallory rule that required a
defendant to be brought promptly before a judicial officer following his arrest. If not, any
confession obtained during custody could not be used. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449,
451-52 (1957). This rule was modified by Congress in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1982), but is not important for the purposes of this
analysis because it is not constitutionally mandated.
42. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 202-03.
April 1988]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
trial.43 Massiah was convicted of murder.44
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the de-
fendant's sixth amendment right to counsel was violated because the gov-
ernment agents had deliberately elicited the admissions in the absence of
his retained counsel after Massiah had been indicted.45 The Court ob-
served that
a Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of counsel at...
trial could surely vouchsafe no less to an indicted defendant under in-
terrogation by the police in a completely extrajudicial proceeding.
Anything less ... might deny a defendant "effective representation by
counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice would help him."
'46
This second stage of confession-case analysis, like stage one, also
resembles present law applicable to the use of defense counsel as witness.
Massiah focused solely on whether the defendant's sixth amendment
right to counsel had been violated and did not even address the privilege
against self-incrimination. Similarly, the three cases analyzed in section
IV, in which defense counsel was required to testify on behalf of the
state, failed to even mention the privilege against self-incrimination, fo-
cusing instead on the sixth amendment, the due process clause, or the
attorney-client privilege.
47
Stage two did not last long because the Supreme Court decided an-
other important confession case, Escobedo v. Illinois, 48 just a few weeks
later. In Escobedo, the defendant, while being questioned about a homi-
cide, repeatedly asked to see his attorney. The police denied the defend-
ant's requests, as well as several requests by his counsel to consult with
Escobedo.49 After four hours of questioning, Escobedo made several
damaging statements, and at trial was convicted of murder.50 The
Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that once an individual
is the focus of investigation by the police, he may not be denied access to
his attorney if he has retained an attorney and requests consultation.
5'
The Court concluded that "our Constitution, unlike some others, strikes
the balance in favor of the right of the accused to be advised by his law-
43. Id. at 203.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 206.
46. Id. at 204 (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)).
47. See infra notes 105-38 and accompanying text.
48. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
49. Id. at 481-82.
50. Id. at 483.
51. Id. at 485. Although the Court explicitly based its holding on the sixth amendment
right to counsel, later opinions by the Court recognized that the primary purpose of Escobedo
was to effectuate fully the privilege against self-incrimination by protecting the right to coun-
sel. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729
(1966).
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yer of his privilege against self-incrimination. 52
Thus, stage three was characterized by the Escobedo holding that
under certain circumstances an accused has the right to have his defense
counsel inform him of his privilege against self-incrimination. Escobedo
can be contrasted to the current analysis used when defense counsel is
witness, because it recognized for the first time in confession cases de-
fense counsel's important role in the accusatorial system of justice. As
the Supreme Court stated in another opinion, Escobedo recognized that
protecting the right to counsel guarantees "full effectuation of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination.
'53
Escobedo, however, has not played a prominent role in fifth amend-
ment jurisprudence because the Court entered a fourth stage of develop-
ment by deciding the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona only two
years later.5 4 The Miranda decision actually combined consideration of
four cases,55 all of which dealt with defendants who had been convicted
partly upon the basis of their admissions resulting from custodial
interrogations.
Miranda reaffirmed the constitutional principles espoused in Esco-
bedo, recognizing that the basic rights expressed in the fifth and sixth
amendments must be protected because they are "precious rights...
fixed in our Constitution only after centuries of persecution and
struggle."
'5 6
After analyzing the historical development of the privilege against
self-incrimination, the Court held that the privilege fully applied to cus-
todial interrogations.5 7 In so doing, the Court stated:
[T]he constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect
a government-state or federal-must accord to the dignity and integ-
rity of its citizens. To maintain a "fair state-individual balance," to
require the government "to shoulder the entire load," to respect the
inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system of crimi-
nal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individ-
ual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors.58
After concluding that the privilege against self-incrimination ap-
plied to custodial interrogations, there remained the question of how the
privilege would require the government to shoulder the entire load. The
Court determined that the presence of counsel would ensure that state
52. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 485.
53. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689 (quoting Johnson, 384 U.S. at 729).
54. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
55. See Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1965); State v. Miranda, 98
Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 721 (1965); People v. Stewart, 62 Cal. 2d 571, 400 P.2d 97, 43 Cal. Rptr.
201 (1965); People v. Vignera, 15 N.Y.2d 970, 207 N.E.2d 527, 259 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1965).
56. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442.
57. Id. at 460-61.
58. Id. at 460 (citation omitted).
April 1988]
behavior conformed to the dictates of the privilege,59 and held that "if
police propose to interrogate a person they must make known to him
that he is entitled to a lawyer and that if he cannot afford one, a lawyer
will be provided for him prior to any interrogation.
60
For the purposes of this Note, Miranda is important for the follow-
ing reasons. First, the Court in Miranda applied the privilege against self-
incrimination to custodial interrogation when an examination of the his-
tory of the privilege suggested its application. For many years prior to
Miranda, the fifth amendment was thought not to apply to custodial in-
terrogation. Similarly, the practice of using defense counsel as witness
for the state is a practice to which it is now felt the privilege does not
apply. The history of the privilege also indicates that this practice, like
custodial interrogation, should conform to the fifth amendment require-
ment that the state shoulder the entire load of proving the accused guilty.
Second, after recognizing that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion applied, the Court in Miranda furthered the historical purpose of the
privilege by at the same time protecting the sixth amendment right to
counsel. Thus, as in Escobedo, the Court in Miranda recognized that the
sixth amendment right to counsel guarantees the full effectuation of the
privilege against self-incrimination.
As in the confession cases, when the state requires defense counsel
to reveal information incriminating to his client, both the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel and the fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination are implicated. Consistent with the analysis in Escobedo and
Miranda, the sixth amendment right to counsel should fully effectuate
the privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, the next section will
examine the Supreme Court's interpretation of the applicability of the
privilege against self-incrimination to the practice of using a defense
counsel as witness against the defendant.
III. The Modern Scope of the Privilege and Its Ramifications
to the Use of Defense Counsel As Witness
A. Restriction of the Historical Scope of the Privilege
(1) The Supreme Court's Interpretation
Under current fifth amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
has set out three requirements that must be met before the fifth amend-
ment privilege can be asserted successfully: 61 the information sought
must be of a testimonial or communicative nature;62 the information
59. Id. at 466.
60. Id. at 474.
61. The tripartite test was enunciated in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761
(1966).
62. A compelled extraction of physical facts that does not disclose a defendant's knowl-
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must be incriminating;63 and the disclosure must be compelled. 64 It is
the last requirement-that the testimony be compelled-that has pre-
cluded defense counsel from invoking the privilege on the defendant's
behalf.
In United States v. Nobles, the Supreme Court interpreted the re-
quirement that disclosure be compelled to mean that the privilege is
"personal to the defendant" and therefore "does not extend to the testi-
mony or statements of third parties called as witnesses at trial. ' 65 In that
case, the Court upheld the trial court's refusal to allow a defense investi-
gator to testify for the defense because the defense counsel refused to give
the prosecution the investigator's report.66 The Supreme Court held that
such a ruling did not violate the defendant's fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination because it compelled the investigator, not the
defendant, to reveal incriminating information contained in the report.
67
Nobles did not decide whether this rule applied when the informa-
tion sought by the state was given by the client directly to his attorney.
Could an attorney successfully claim that the accused's fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination would be violated if the attorney were
forced to turn over incriminating information given directly to him by
edge is nontestimonial and therefore not protected by the privilege. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Cali-
fornia, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting samples held nontestimonial); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood samples held nontestimonial). In the three cases ana-
lyzed in section IV, see infra notes 105-38 and accompanying text, the prosecution or tribunal
attempted to obtain a defendant's knowledge through testimony by his defense counsel. This
criterion, therefore, would not prevent the use of the privilege in these three cases.
63. The leading case defining incrimination is Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479
(1951). There the Court stated that the fifth amendment right "must be accorded liberal con-
struction in favor of the right it was intended to secure." Id. at 486. The Court went on to
state the rule that "[t]he privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in them-
selves support a conviction.., but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the
chain of evidence needed to prosecute." Id. In my proposal, I suggest that this test be modified
to include not only evidence that could lead to a conviction but also evidence that could lead to
a deprivation of the defendant's liberty, such as evidence presented at a competency hearing.
In each case that will be analyzed in section IV, defense counsel was required to divulge infor-
mation that could be used, if not directly, at least indirectly by the prosecution in a later
proceeding to convict the accused or deprive him of liberty. See infra notes 105-38 and accom-
panying text.
64. The fifth amendment bars only the use of incriminating statements that are compelled
by the state. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977). The usual question under
this test is whether the privilege has been validly "waived," rendering the resulting information
voluntary rather than compelled. See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 n.9 (1976).
The focus of this Note, however, is on the Supreme Court's interpretation in Fisher that the
"compelled" requirement means that the compulsion must be personal to the defendant, even
with respect to information he has transmitted to his attorney. Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 398-99 (1976).
65. 422 U.S. 225, 234 (1975); see Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973);
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944).
66. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 227.
67. Id. at 233-34.
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his client? The year after Nobles was decided, the Supreme Court an-
swered this question negatively in Fisher v. United States.
68
Fisher involved several taxpayers who were under investigation for
violation of federal income tax laws. The taxpayers transferred tax prep-
aration documents from their accountants to their attorneys to aid in the
preparation of their defense. 69 The Internal Revenue Service served sum-
monses on the attorneys requiring them to produce the documents.70
The attorneys refused to comply, invoking the fifth amendment. 71 The
Supreme Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination did not
prevent the government from requiring the attorneys to hand over docu-
ments received from the defendants because "enforcement against a tax-
payer's lawyer would not 'compel' the taxpayer to do anything-and
certainly would not compel him to be a 'witness' against himself...
Agent or no, the lawyer is not the taxpayer. The taxpayer is the 'ac-
cused,' and nothing is being extorted from him."' 72
The Court also created an exception to this rule, stating: "[Wihen
the client himself would be privileged from production of the document,
... as exempt from self-incrimination, the attorney having possession of
the document is not bound to produce. '73 This exemption was said to
further the purposes of the attorney-client privilege.74 The exception,
however, did not apply to the facts in Fisher because the documents
would not have been protected even if the defendant had been subpoe-
naed to produce them. Thus, the court concluded that the documents
were not privileged in the hands of the defendant and, therefore, could
not become privileged by transferring them to defense counsel.
The rule that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is not violated if someone other than the defendant is compelled to
reveal information incriminating to the defendant was held in Fisher to
be equally applicable to defense counsel except for the limited document
exception. In other words, when the state requires a defense counsel to
testify against the accused, under Fisher, the privilege against self-incrim-
ination does not apply.
68. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
69. Id. at 394.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 395.
72. Id. at 397-98.
73. Id. at 404 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2307 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)
(emphasis in original)).
74. The attorney-client privilege protects confidential disclosures made by a client to an
attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal assistance. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 73, § 2292.
The purpose of the privilege is to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys.
Id. § 2291. The Court in Fisher, however, found that the preexisting documents could have
been obtained by court process from the client and therefore could be obtained from the attor-
ney to whom the documents were transferred without violating the attorney-client privilege.
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 404.
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The way the Court analyzed the privilege against self-incrimination
in Fisher is inconsistent with the way in which the Court analyzed the
privilege in Miranda; that is, Fisher did not consider the historical pur-
pose of the privilege in determining whether the privilege should apply.
Instead, Fisher disregarded the historical purpose of the privilege and
interpreted its scope more narrowly than the Framers' intended purpose:
to use the privilege to protect and maintain the accusatorial system of
justice. Nevertheless, this interpretation has allowed later courts to dis-
regard the historical purpose as well. The late Justice Black predicted
the subsequent erosion of the privilege fifteen years ago in his dissent to
Williams v. Florida.75 As the next section will demonstrate, Justice
Black's analysis of the privilege against self-incrimination in his Williams
dissent delinieates the proper scope of the privilege.
(2) Justice Black's Interpretation and California's Adoption
In Williams v. Florida, a majority of the United States Supreme
Court held that the fifth amendment privilege does not prevent a state
from requiring a criminal defendant to make a pretrial disclosure of the
nature of his alibi defense and the names and addresses of witnesses he
will call to support that defense.76 The majority reasoned that the de-
fendant was not compelled to be a witness against himself because he
voluntarily chose to use an alibi defense.77
Justice Black disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the fifth
amendment, stating: "[It] is a radical and dangerous departure from the
historical and constitutionally guaranteed right of a defendant in a crimi-
nal case to remain completely silent, requiring the State to prove its case
without any assistance of any kind from the defendant himself."' 78 Justice
Black interpreted the words of the fifth amendment to mean that the
state cannot require a criminal defendant to give it evidence, testimony,
or any other assistance to aid it in convicting him of crime.79 The major-
ity holding, in Justice Black's view, violated the privilege because "it re-
quire[d] a defendant to disclose information to the State so that the State
(could) use that information to destroy him." 80
Justice Black recognized the far reaching implications that Williams
would have on fifth amendment jurisprudence: "On the surface this case
involves only a notice-of-alibi provision, but in effect the decision opens
the way for a profound change in one of the most important safeguards
of a criminal defendant. The rationale of today's decision is in no way
75. 399 U.S. 78, 106 (1970) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. Id. at 83.
77. Id. at 84.
78. Id. at 108 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79. Id. at 111.
80. Id.
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limited to alibi defenses." '81
Only Justice Douglas joined Justice Black in his dissenting opinion,
but his words have not fallen on deaf ears. In 1985, the California
Supreme Court in In re Misener 2 adopted the principle enunciated by
Justice Black, that the state bears the entire burden of proving a defend-
ant guilty. 83 The California Supreme Court there held that California
Penal Code Section 1102.5, which permitted the prosecution to discover
prior statements made by defense witnesses to defense counsel, violated
"that aspect of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination requir-
ing the prosecution to carry the entire burden of proving the defendant's
guilt."8
4
In re Misener involved a public defender, Misener, who was defense
counsel for two Hispanic men charged with attempted robbery. At trial,
Misener called various witnesses to establish that the defendants were
improperly identified. One such witness, Mario Alarcon, testified that
the defendants were at a soccer game, rather than at the scene of the
robbery at the time the robbery allegedly took place. After Alarcon's
testimony, the prosecution moved under Penal Code section 1102.5 to
discover any prior statements made by the witness to defense counsel.
Misener objected on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional.
At an in camera hearing, Misener stated that he and his client had
met together with Alarcon on numerous occasions and had made written
notes of one meeting and mental notes of the others. Misener refused,
however, to reveal the content of the interviews, explaining that the inter-
views arose out of information that the defendant had given him as his
attorney and that the defendant's statements were completely inter-
twined with those of the witness. Disclosing the content of the inter-
views, the defendant argued, would have violated his attorney-client
privilege, his constitutional right to counsel, and his privilege against
self-incrimination. 85 The court found that the statute was unconstitu-
tional under the California privilege against self-incrimination and, ac-
81. Id. at 114.
82. 38 Cal. 3d 543, 698 P.2d 637, 213 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1985).
83. In re Misener does not involve a defense counsel being called as a witness against his
client as do the three opinions analyzed in section IV. Although I have found no California
cases specifically ruling on the factual situations presented in the three cases discussed in
section IV, in People v. Lathrom, 192 Cal. App. 2d 216, 227-30, 13 Cal. Rptr. 325, 332-34
(1961), a case decided long before Williams v. Florida, a California appellate court reversed a
lower court's decision to allow a prosecutor to call a defendant's counsel as witness for the
prosecution during the prosecution's case. One scholar has stated that one of the reasons that
the court reversed was because the prosecutor "overcame the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion." B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 377, at 370 (1963). It would ap-
pear, therefore, that the Misener reasoning would apply in California to the use of defense
counsel as witness.
84. Misener, 38 Cal. 3d at 545, 698 P.2d at 638, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
85. Id. at 546, 698 P.2d at 638, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
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cordingly, did not address the attorney-client privilege or right to counsel
claims.
86
The district attorney, challenging the trial court's decision, argued
that the Nobles Court had held that the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination did not bar the court from ordering the defense to dis-
close information regarding discussions with a defense witness. The Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating: "Nobles failed to
consider the aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination that re-
quires the prosecution to carry the entire burden of convicting a defend-
ant."' 87  Furthermore, since the California Supreme Court was
interpreting the California Constitution, it was not required to follow the
United States Supreme Court's more narrow interpretation of the federal
privilege.
The court stated in dicta that even if the federal decision limiting the
privilege to the defendant's own statements was controlling, the Misener
decision would be consistent with Nobles because "a witness' statements
to a defense attorney may be inextricably intertwined with the defend-
ant's own statements. A defense attorney often finds witnesses through
the defendant, and interviews those witnesses using information given to
him by the defendant. ' 88 The California Supreme Court's reasoning ap-
plies with even more force when the state calls a defense counsel to testify
as to information he has received directly from the defendant. In that
situation, the information the prosecutor seeks is even more likely to be
inextricably intertwined with statements made by the defendant. Thus,
the California Supreme Court's adoption of Justice Black's interpretation
of the fifth amendment provides a model of the way the privilege should
be applied when defense counsel is required to testify against the accused.
The defendant attorney in In re Misener also contended that the
lower court had violated his client's attorney-client privilege, but because
the court decided the issue on the basis of the privilege against self-in-
crimination, it did not address the attorney-client privilege question. In
the three cases analyzed in section IV, however, the courts decided
whether it was appropriate to use a defense counsel as a witness against
his client partly or entirely on the basis of the attorney-client privilege,
not addressing the privilege against self-incrimination. The next section
will examine the attorney-client privilege to determine the ramifications
of failing to analyze the privilege against self-incrimination when defense
counsel is called as witness against the accused.
B. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege protects certain confidential disclosures
86. Id. at 546, 698 P.2d at 638, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
87. Id. at 558, 698 P.2d at 648, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
88. Id. at 558, 698 P.2d at 647, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
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made by a client to his attorney to obtain legal assistance. 89 The purpose
of the privilege is to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their
attorneys.90
There are several exceptions to the privilege. For example, attor-
neys usually may be questioned as to the whereabouts of their client.9 1
Attorneys also may be questioned, absent special circumstances, con-
cerning the receipt of fees and the identity of the client.92 Unfortunately,
these exceptions have been used by courts to justify decisions in which
defense attorneys are required to reveal information incriminating to
their client. For example, in In re Doe, 93 a case examined in section IV,
the prosecution sought to require defense counsel to testify at a grand
jury proceeding about whether the defendant had arranged for defense
counsel to represent members of the defendant's alleged organization.
The prosecution sought to establish that the defendant had violated the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 9 4 The
Second Circuit, en banc, held that the defense counsel was required to
testify even though the information might have been "necessary to obtain
legal advice ... [and] even though it might incriminate the client," be-
cause client identity and fee information are not protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege.
95
When a court requires defense counsel to testify against his client, it
creates problems other than that of undermining the accusatorial system
of justice. Compelling an attorney to testify against his client, even when
the prosecutor seeks only unprivileged information, will destroy the trust
and confidence essential to the attorney-client relationship and inhibit the
defendant from freely confiding in his attorney information that is in fact
privileged. 96 The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is then under-
mined-clients are discouraged rather than encouraged to make full
disclosure.97
89. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 73, § 2292.
90. Id. §§ 2291, 2306.
91. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Field, 408 F. Supp. 1169. 1173
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
92. See In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1984).
93. 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied. 475 U.S. 1108 (1986).
94. Id. at 242.
95. Id. at 247-48 (citing In re Shargel, 742 F.2d at 63).
96. See id. at 260 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
97. In certain cases, neither the attorney-client privilege nor the privilege against self-
incrimination should prevent disclosure. For example, if the communication is made for the
purpose of committing a future crime, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility gives the
attorney the right, but does not impose the duty, to reveal the clients intention "to commit a
crime, and the information necessary to prevent the crime." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1981). Before a court makes an exception to the attorney-
client privilege and requires defense counsel to reveal information incriminating to the ac-
cused, the court should ascertain whether such an exception would undermine the historical
purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination.
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Another problem that arises when there is the possibility that the
state will require defense counsel to testify against his client is that the
defendant may feel compelled to choose between the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment right to
counsel. The defendant, when faced with the prospect of being incrimi-
nated by his counsel's testimony, may elect to forego assistance of coun-
sel to assure that his fifth amendment privilege will not be violated. The
next section examines this conundrum of requiring a defendant to choose
between constitutional rights.
C. Forcing the Accused to Sacrifice a Constitutional Right
The three cases analyzed in section IV exemplify how prosecutors
have begun to use the defense counsel against the accused. In permitting
this practice, the courts, in effect, are penalizing the accused for exercis-
ing his sixth amendment right to counsel. The state is gaining a witness,
the defense counsel, that it would not have had but for the accused's
invocation of his right to counsel. In these cases, the only way the ac-
cused can ensure that the state will fulfill its fifth amendment duty to
prove its own case without any assistance from the accused is by deciding
not to obtain a lawyer. But the accused would then be foregoing one
constitutional right, the sixth amendment right to counsel, to gain an-
other constitutional right, the fifth amendment guarantee that the state
will prove its own case. Furthermore, as shown in the analysis of the
confession cases, the sixth amendment right to counsel protects and
guarantees the full effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Thus, if an accused opts not to exercise his right to counsel for fear that
his counsel's testimony may later be used against him, the accused's fifth
amendment right is not fully effectuated either. In effect, the accused has
lost the benefit of both rights.
In another context, the Supreme Court has concluded that the sur-
render of one constitutional right for the exercise of another imposes an
impermissible penalty. In Simmons v. United States, the Court held that
when a defendant testifies at a suppression hearing on the issue of stand-
ing to object to evidence, his testimony may not later be admitted against
him on the issue of guilt.98 The defendant's testimony in Simmons was
inadmissible because it placed the defendant in a position in which he
was forced either to give up what he believed to be a valid fourth amend-
ment claim or to waive his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation.99 The Court found it constitutionally impermissible to force a
defendant to choose between constitutional rights. 100
98. 390 U.S. 377, 389-90 (1968).
99. Id. at 394.
100. Id.
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McGautha v. California, 10 1 a subsequent Supreme Court decision,
qualified the language in Simmons. The McGautha Court, upholding
Ohio's procedure of having a single trial on the issues of guilt and pun-
ishment, rejected the defendant's argument that this procedure presented
an intolerable tension between his due process right to address his sen-
tencer and his privilege against self-incrimination. 0 2 The Court articu-
lated the test as "whether compelling the election impairs to an
appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved."
10 3
The Supreme Court has applied the McGautha test in subsequent
cases, 10 4 but has not articulated a clear standard for determining when
compelling a choice between rights constitutes a penalty for the assertion
of a constitutional right as opposed to a mere tactical decision. Mc-
Gautha made clear, however, that the focus of the inquiry is whether
compelling a choice impairs the policies behind the rights involved. Ac-
cordingly, when applying the McGautha test to the situation in which the
defense counsel is compelled to testify against the client, the focus of the
inquiry is the policies behind the fifth and sixth amendment. The policy
behind the privilege against self-incrimination is to maintain an accusato-
rial system. One of the policies underlying the right to counsel is to pro-
vide an accused with defense counsel to even the balance between the
state and the individual, thereby effectuating the privilege against self-
incrimination. As discussed in the next section, however, the courts have
not addressed this problem using this analysis.
IV. Recent Examples of the Use of
Defense Counsel As Witness
A. Bishop v. Superior Court
In Bishop v. Superior Court, the Arizona Supreme Court held that a
judge may require a defense attorney to testify regarding his client's com-
101. 402 U.S. 183 (1971), reh'g denied, 406 U.S. 978 (1972) (superseded by Federal Rule
of Evidence § 609(a), as stated in United States v. Oaks, 565 F.2d 170, 173 n.l 1 (1st Cir.
1977)). The Court in McGautha qualified Simmons by stating, "While we have no occasion to
question the soundness of the result in Simmons and do not do so, to the extent that its ration-
ale was based on a 'tension' between constitutional rights and the policies behind them. the
validity of that reasoning must now be regarded as open to question . Id. at 212.
102. Id. at 210-17.
103. Id. at 213.
104. See, e.g., Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), in which the Court applied the
McGautha test to a statute requiring the defendant to testify, if at all, before any other defense
witnesses. The Court held that this requirement unconstitutionally infringed on the right to
remain silent "by making its assertion costly." Id. at 611 (quoting Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609, 614 (1965); see also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), in which the Court
held that drawing adverse inferences against an inmate for failure to testify in a prison discipli-
nary proceeding did not impose an impermissible penalty on the exercise of one's fifth amend-
ment right to remain silent. Id. at 316.
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petency to stand trial or to plead guilty.10 5 In Bishop, the attorney ap-
pointed to represent a defendant charged with first degree murder
observed that the defendant's competency to stand trial was in question
and moved for a competency hearing pursuant to the Arizona Rules of
Criminal Procedure.106 Although the defendant failed to attend the
hearing, in his absence the court found him to be competent. The de-
fendant subsequently pleaded guilty in a plea bargain with the state and
received a life sentence.10
7
After the plea bargain, however, the defendant appealed on the
ground that he had not voluntarily waived his constitutional right to be
present at the competency hearing. The Arizona Supreme Court agreed
and decided that there had never been a valid determination of the de-
fendant's competency to plead guilty. 108 It remanded the case to the trial
court for a retrospective determination of defendant's competency at the
time he entered the plea.10 9 The trial court, in making this determina-
tion, called the defense counsel to testify on the issue of the defendant's
past competency. Claiming that it would violate the attorney-client privi-
lege, the defense counsel petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court to vacate
the order. The Arizona Supreme Court acknowledged that "[a]ny ex-
pression as to the client's mental competency necessarily embrace[s]
more than facts observable by anyone; it comprehend[s] conclusions
drawn in the course of an association that is uniquely regarded in the
law." 110 Nevertheless, the court determined that there was no violation
of the attorney-client privilege because observation is not communication
and thus not protected.
In upholding the trial court's decision to call the defense counsel to
testify on the defendant's past competency, the Arizona Supreme Court
concluded that a competency hearing is qualitatively different from a
trial.I 1 The major distinction underlying the court's conclusion is that a
competency hearing, unlike a regular trial, is nonadversarial. In a com-
petency hearing there are no generally established positions; a delay may
occur that sometimes will benefit the defendant and other times will help
the state.1 12 In other words, a prosecutor, in certain circumstances,
105. 150 Ariz. 404, 410-11, 724 P.2d 23, 29-30 (1986).
106. ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 11.
107. Bishop, 150 Ariz. at 405, 724 P.2d at 24.
108. See State v. Bishop, 139 Ariz. 567, 570, 679 P.2d 1054, 1057 (1984).
109. Bishop, 150 Ariz. at 405, 724 P.2d at 24.
110. Id. at 410, 724 P.2d at 29 (quoting Gunther v. United States, 230 F.2d 222, 223-24
(D.C. Cir. 1956)).
111. Id. at 410-11, 724 P.2d at 29-30.
112. Id. at 408, 724 P.2d at 27. The Court relied on Pizzi, Competency to Stand Trial in
Federal Courts: Conceptual and Constitutional Problems, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 21 (1977). In his
article, Professor Pizzi asserts that the original purpose of the competency hearings was to
ensure that defendant would be able to play a meaningful role in his trial, and that a corollary
to this basic principle is that the role of defense counsel at a competency hearing is that of an
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might prefer that the accused be found incompetent.
Contrary to the conclusion drawn by the Arizona Supreme Court
that a prosecutor may seek to involuntarily hospitalize a defendant, the
position that a prosecutor may seek to involuntarily incarcerate the de-
fendant supports the view that a competency hearing actually is an ad-
versarial proceeding. For example, a defendant who is a first-time
offender or who faces minor charges may receive a substantially longer
period of involuntary hospitalization if found incompetent than the sen-
tence he might have received from a conviction." 13 While a prosecutor in
that situation may prefer a finding of incompetency, defense counsel
would naturally be opposed to it. The situation is also adversarial when,
as in Bishop, the defense counsel believes the defendant is incompetent,
but the prosecutor wants to establish his competency so that he may be
prosecuted. Thus, using defense counsel as a witness, in many circum-
stances, may give the prosecution a weapon it would not otherwise have
had to further its own adverse interests.
It follows that to the extent defense counsel's testimony furthers the
prosecutor's adverse interests, the disclosure is incriminating to the ac-
cused. Under Hoffman v. United States, however, information is incrimi-
nating only if it would "lead directly or indirectly to a conviction.""14
Because Rule 11.7 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure states
that no evidence obtained at a competency hearing will "be admissible at
any proceeding to determine guilt or innocence," the information would
not be considered incriminating under Hoffman and the privilege against
self-incrimation would not apply. Thus, application of the Supreme
Court's current interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimation to
the facts of Bishop would be inapposite because under Fisher, the defend-
ant has not been compelled to testify, and under Hoffman, the informa-
tion is not incriminating. Such a restrictive interpretation of the
privilege, however, fails to protect an accused during the competency
hearing, which may be as adversarial as the trial itself. Thus, this Note
suggests a proposal that interprets the privilege against self-incrimination
to mandate that the state, whether it prefers to incarcerate the defendant
or place him in a mental facility, bears the burden of proving its own case
without any assistance from the defendant, including the use of testi-
mony by his defense counsel.
assistant because, among other reasons, a competency hearing is nonadversarial. Id. at 55.
Pizzi suggests, for example, that "if the defendant faces relatively minor charges, the prosecu-
tor may take the position that involuntary hospitalization is, if not preferable, at least
equivalent to a criminal sentence on these charges." Id.
113. Id. at 28.
114. 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
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B. Commonwealth v. Maguigan
In Commonwealth v. Maguigan, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that a criminal defense attorney may be required to reveal the
whereabouts of her fugitive client, a criminal suspect. 115 The defendant
in that case was charged with rape and other sex-related crimes but was
released on bail on the condition that he appear for trial.116 When the
defendant did not appear, the prosecutor moved to compel defense coun-
sel to disclose the address and phone number of her client. Although
defense counsel statdd that she did not know her client's address or
phone number, it was later discovered that she had information that
could lead to the defendant's whereabouts.
At a subsequent hearing to determine the applicability of the attor-
ney-client privilege, the trial court held that the information concerning
the defendant's whereabouts was not privileged and held defense counsel
in contempt for not disclosing it.117 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's order, relying on well-established precedent that
a defendant's address is not within the attorney-client privilege. 18
Although the court considered the attorney-client privilege ques-
tion, it did not consider whether the defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination was violated by requiring defense counsel to divulge infor-
mation regarding the defendant's whereabouts. Applying Fisher, the
court found that the privilege against self-incrimination would not apply
because the defendant was not personally compelled to be a witness
against himself. The court reached this conclusion even though the state
could use the defense counsel's testimony to help it prove the defendant
committed the felony of intentionally violating a court order to appear at
trial,' 19 and to help it prove the defendant was guilty of the crimes for
115. 511 Pa. 112, 511 A.2d 1327 (1986).
116. Id. at 116, 511 A.2d at 1329.
117. Id. at 118, 511 A.2d at 1330.
118. See, e.g., In re Application to Compel the Testimony of John Doe, Esq., 117 Misc.
197, 201, 456 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315 (1982) (whereabouts of fugitive defendant not protected by
attorney-client privilege); United States v. Woodruff, 383 F. Supp. 696, 698 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
(whether attorney notified defendant of trial date and place is not a privileged communication
because subject matter underlying case not involved); Jafarian-Kerman v. Jafarian-Kerman,
424 S.W.2d 333, 340 (Mo. App. 1967) (address of defendant who absconded with child, con-
trary to court order, held not privileged).
119. Subdivision (a) of § 5124 of the Pennsylvania Criminal Code states:
A person set at liberty by court order, with or without bail, upon condition that
he will subsequently appear at a specified time and place, commits a misdemeanor of
the second degree if, without lawful excuse, he fails to appear at that time and place.
The offense constitutes a felony of the third degree where the required appearance
was to answer to a charge of felony, or for disposition of any such charge, and the
actor took flight or went into hiding to avoid apprehension, trial or punishment.
This section is similar to § 242.8 of the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.8
(1962).
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which he had been charged. 120
The decision in Maguigan illustrates how the United States Supreme
Court's restrictive interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion leads to decisions that run contrary to the historical purpose of the
privilege that, as Justice Black stated, provides the accused the "absolute,
unqualified right to compel the State to investigate its own case, find its
own witnesses, prove its own facts, and convince the jury through its own
resources."' 12 1 This interpretation mandates that the state prosecute the
defendant without the assistance of defense counsel-a witness it would
not have but for the accused's invocation of his right to counsel.
Although prosecutors may argue that such a rule makes the system inef-
ficient, "[t]he Framers decided that the benefits to be derived from ...
the Bill of Rights were well worth any loss in 'efficiency' that
resulted." 1
22
Aside from illustrating how the Supreme Court's restrictive inter-
pretation of the privilege against self-incrimination leads to decisions that
run contrary to the historical purposes of the privilege, Maguigan also
illustrates how difficult it is to apply constitutional rights in cases with
egregious facts. The prosecution in Maguigan was forced to deal with a
defense counsel whose client, an alleged rapist, had failed to show for
trial. The prosecutor's explanation of the conversations she had with de-
fense counsel reveal her frustration:
[W]hen I asked, Where is (defendant); do you know, she said, I can't
tell you that. As a result of that I brought in this little girl who was
raped repeatedly when she was ten years old and two little brothers
and prepped them for five hours yesterday to have them ready to tes-
tify on the representation that she would be ready to go to trial in this
case today. Those kids have gone through living hell. 1
23
As Judge Papadakos observed, "[The prosecutor's] impassioned
narrative ... gives the reader a very clear idea that [her] fervor reeked of
prosecutorial frustration in bringing this case to trial and in desperation,
the prosecutor turned with full force to the only person left, [defense
counsel]." 124
The proposal in section V would prevent prosecutors from requiring
120. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 271 at 803 (3d ed. 1984) ("Many acts of a
defendant after the crime seeking to escape the toils of the law are uncritically received as
admissions by conduct, constituting circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt and
hence of the fact of guilt itself. In this class [is] . . . forfeiture of bond by failure to appear
. . . .1).
121. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 112 (1970) (Black, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
122. Id. at 113-14 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123. Maguigan, 511 Pa. at 137, 511 A.2d at 1340 (Papadakos, J., dissenting) (quoting
Suzanne McDonough, Assistant District Attorney).
124. Id. Judge Papadakos argued that the attorney-client privilege should have prevented
disclosure.
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defense counsel to reveal information that incriminates the defendant-
including information concerning the whereabouts of an accused who
has not shown for trial. Some may find it quite difficult to apply such a
rule to the factual setting in Maguigan; yet, as the Supreme Court de-
clared long ago:
[Constitutional rights] are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet
passing occasions. They are... "designed to approach immortality as
nearly as human institutions can approach it."... In the application
of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what
has been but of what may be. Under any other rule a constitution
would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in effi-
cacy and power. Its general principles would have little value and be
converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights de-
clared in words might be lost in reality.
125
If the proposal in this Note is adopted, prosecutors would no longer
be allowed to turn with full force to the defense counsel when a problem
arises in prosecuting a defendant. Such a rule is necessary to maintain
that aspect of the fifth amendment requiring a state to prove its own case
or else, as the Supreme Court warned long ago, "rights declared in words
will be lost in reality."
126
C. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon John Doe, Esq.
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon John Doe, Esq., the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals, en banc, held that the government was not
constitutionally required to make a preliminary showing of need prior to
subpoenaing a defense attorney to testify against his client in a grand jury
proceeding. 127 In In re Doe, a grand jury was investigating the activities
of the defendant and his alleged connections with an organized crime
family. In connection with this investigation, the government served a
subpoena duces tecum on the defendant's attorney requiring him to turn
over records of fees he had received from the defendant.128 The govern-
ment intended to use these records, along with the defense counsel's testi-
mony, to prove that the defendant had arranged for the legal
representation of members of his alleged organization so as to establish
that the defendant was the head of an "enterprise" as that term is defined
in RICO. 129
The defense counsel moved to quash the subpoena pursuant to Rule
125. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
126. Id. at 373.
127. 781 F.2d 238, 244 (2d Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986).
128. Id. at 242. The records were not protected by the attorney-client privilege because fee
information and client identity is not privileged information even though it might incriminate
the client. Id. at 247. (citing In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1984); Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633, 637-38 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); United States v.
Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 752 (1944)).
129. Enterprise is defined as including "any individual, partnership, corporation, associa-
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17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 130 arguing the govern-
ment had failed to show need for the information. He also argued that
honoring the subpoena would violate the attorney-client privilege. The
trial judge denied the motion but his decision was reversed on appeal by
a Second Circuit panel.' 3 ' The defendant was subsequently indicted by
the grand jury for a number of federal crimes.
The Second Circuit Court, sitting en banc, reviewed the panel's deci-
sion to uphold the subpoena duces tecum. The court held that the sub-
poena did not violated the attorney-client privilege because disclosure of
fee information and client identity is not privileged even though it might
incriminate the client. 132 The court then turned to the question of
whether the government was required to show any need for the informa-
tion, either prior to indictment, or after indictment.
(1) Pre-indictment
The court held that before the defendant was indicted, his sixth
amendment rights had not been violated by requiring the defense counsel
to testify against him. 133 The court relied on Kirby v. Illinois, a United
States Supreme Court decision that held that the sixth amendment right
to counsel does not attach until "the time that adversary judicial pro-
ceedings have been initiated against him."'' 34  Since adversary judicial
proceedings are not initiated, the Second Circuit reasoned, the accused
has no pre-indictment right to counsel that can be violated.
This reasoning illustrates how courts, in determining the constitu-
tionality of using a defense counsel against his client, focus on the sixth
amendment right to counsel and fail to consider the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Regardless of when the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel attaches, the privilege against self-incrimination
should be interpreted to require the government to prove its own case
without any assistance from the accused. In In re Doe, the accused, by
obtaining defense counsel, supplied the government with a witness from
whom the government could gain information to indict and eventually
prosecute the accused.
tion, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although
not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1970).
130. The pertinent part of rule 17(c) states, "A subpoena may also command the person to
whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents or other objects designated
therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compli-
ance would be unreasonable or oppressive." FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
131. Il re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon John Doe, Esq., 759 F.2d 968 (2d Cir.
1985).
132. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon John Doe, Esq., 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.
1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986).
133. Id. at 245.
134. 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972).
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The Second Circuit has set a dangerous precedent. It would have
been less dangerous, although by no means proper, had the court simply
held that an accused could not obtain counsel prior to indictment. At
least then the government would be forced to prove its own case, without
the accused's counsel to aid it. The opinion's holding, however, suggests
that though an accused may obtain counsel to represent him during a
grand jury proceeding, the state reserves the right to require defense
counsel to disclose information that, though not protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege, is nevertheless incriminating to the accused. The ac-
cused in In re Doe was in an arguably worse position by hiring an
attorney because, once he did, the state was able to use the attorney
against him.
(2) Post-indictment
After deciding that the defendant did not have a sixth amendment
right to counsel prior to indictment, the court analyzed whether the right
to counsel required the government to show need for defense counsel's
testimony after the defendant's indictment. The court concluded that to
determine whether the government must show need to serve a subpoena
upon the defense counsel after the defendant's indictment, a trial court
"must weigh the probative value of the information the government seeks
against the loss of counsel of the accused's choice."
135
The court based its decision in the post-indictment stage on the
grand jury's need for the information. The court justified its narrow in-
terpretation of the right to counsel by emphasizing the investigative func-
tion of the grand jury. The grand jury, the court argued, serves a vital
role in investigating the evidence a state has compiled against an accused
to determine whether there should be a trial. The court concluded that
limiting the government's access to fee information "would hamper se-
verely the investigative function of the grand jury, if not stop the grand
jury 'dead in its tracks.' "136
The court's reasoning, aside from failing to analyze the privilege
against self-incrimination as it did in its pre-indictment analysis, ne-
glected the fact that grand juries serve an additional function: they act as
investigators weighing the sufficiency of evidence required for an indict-
ment and as guardians of the public protecting it against arbitrary and
oppressive government action. 137 The majority focused on the investiga-
tive function and disregarded the broader function of the grand jury as
protector of the people's rights to be free of arbitrary and oppressive gov-
ernmental action. The court's holding encourages the grand jury not to
stand between the prosecutor and the accused but to act as a passageway
135. Doe, 781 F.2d at 250.
136. Id. at 248.
137. Id. at 255 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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through which the prosecutor can drag an attorney and force him to turn
over evidence that can be used at trial to convict the defendant.
It is well settled that the information sought by the prosecutor in In
re Doe could not be obtained through the accused because he is privileged
from revealing incriminating information. 138 In re Doe allows the prose-
cutor to obtain this privileged information through the back door, how-
ever, by requiring defense counsel to reveal it. The court makes a
mockery of the constitutional guarantees of the right to counsel and the
privilege against self-incrimination when it uses defense counsel to in-
criminate the defendant.
V. Proposal
The history of the fifth amendment reveals that the purpose of the
privilege against self-incrimination was to limit the powers of govern-
ment by requiring it to maintain an accusatorial system of justice. 139 An
accusatorial system of justice requires the state to prove its own case
without any assistance from the defendant. 14° The American criminal
justice system is also adversarial--opposing parties vie against each other
for a result favorable to themselves. 1
41
By providing an accused with the right to counsel, the Framers en-
sured both the adversarial and the accusatorial aspects of our system of
justice. Defense counsel ensures the proper operation of the adversarial
system by allowing the accused to adequately oppose the government.
Defense counsel helps to maintain the accusatorial system by ensuring
that the state will bear its burden of proving the accused guilty. It is this
second function of defense counsel-maintaining the accusatorial sys-
tem-that was not analyzed in Fisher 142 and later cases. The failure to
address this function has left the door open for the state's use of defense
counsel as a witness.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the privilege against self-in-
crimination in Fisher was inconsistent with its interpretation of the privi-
lege in Miranda. 143 In Miranda, the Supreme Court recognized that the
defense counsel protects the underlying purpose of the privilege against
self-incrimination by ensuring that the state will bear the entire load. 144
Justice Black's interpretation and analysis of the privilege against self-
138. In Leftkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973), the Supreme Court held that an
individual has a constitutional right to remain silent in any "proceeding civil or criminal,
formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings."
139. L. LEVY, supra note 20, at viii.
140. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
141. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 22, at 23.
142. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
143. Compare supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text with supra notes 69-75 and ac-
companying text.
144. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966).
[Vol. 39
incrimination in his dissent in Williams v. Florida145 and California's
adoption of that interpretation provide examples of proper application of
the privilege in accordance with historical fifth amendment jurispru-
dence. Thus, the Supreme Court's holding in Fisher that, except for the
limited document exception, defense counsel cannot raise the privilege
against self-incrimination when the state requires him to disclose infor-
mation incriminating to the accused, must be re-examined in light of its
subsequent application. The effect of this decision has been, as Justice
Black predicted in his dissent in Williams v. Florida, an "inch-by-inch,
case-by-case process ... which ... [will] transform radically our system
of criminal justice into a process requiring the defendant to assist the
State in convicting him, or be punished for failing to do S0. ' ' 146 Even
Justice Black probably did not foresee the insidious manner in which
states have required defendants to assist in their own prosecution-by
using the accused's defense counsel as a witness against the accused.
The Supreme Court can prevent such violation of the historical pur-
pose of the privilege against self-incrimination by interpreting it to pre-
clude the state from requiring a defense counsel to disclose information
that could incriminate the accused. In other words, calling defense coun-
sel to reveal information incriminating to the accused, violates the ac-
cused's fifth amendment right because the state is not proving its own
case. The term "incrimination" should include information that could
directly or indirectly support a conviction for a crime or a deprivation of
liberty. In each of the three cases analyzed, the state acquired a witness
that it would not have had but for the accused's decision to obtain a
defense counsel.' 47 Thus, under the suggested proposal, in each of the
cases discussed in section IV the state violated the accused's right to in-
sist that the state bear the entire burden of proving him guilty.
Such a proposal would better safeguard the historical purpose of the
privilege against self-incrimination: to maintain an accusatorial system of
justice in which the state bears the burden of proving its own case with-
out any assistance from the defendant. The proposal would also prevent
the defendant from having to sacrifice one constitutional right to safe-
guard another-an accused would not have to forego his right to an at-
torney to ensure the state will prove its own case without the use of
defense counsel. Finally, the proposal would further the underlying pur-
pose of the attorney-client privilege. If a defendant knows there is no
possibility that his attorney will be used against him, he will more likely
make full disclosure to his counsel.
145. 399 U.S. 78, 111-16 (1970) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146. Id. at 115.
147. It is true that a defense counsel who is a percipient witness to the crime would be
sought by the state for his testimony anyway. It is unethical, however, for an attorney to agree
to represent a defendant in such a situation. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 3.7(a) (1983).
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Conclusion
As Justice Brennan stated in his dissent to Fisher v. United States:
"History and principle, not the mechanical application of its wording,
have been the life of the [Fifth] Amendment." , 8 This Note has shown
how the history and principles embodied in the fifth amendment urge a
reexamination of the limitation expressed in Fisher when a court requires
defense counsel to reveal information incriminating to the accused. The
history of the fifth amendment reveals the delicate balance the Framers
sought to provide between the state and the accused. Using defense
counsel as witness against the accused upsets that balance and endangers
the accusatorial system of justice.
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination should be
interpreted to require the state to bear the full burden of proving guilt.
When courts determine new methods of conducting the criminal trial
process, they must remember that the fifth amendment assures the ac-
cused the
absolute, unqualified right to compel the State to investigate its own
case, find its own witnesses, prove its own facts, and convince the jury
through its own resources. Throughout the process the defendant has
a fundamental right to remain silent, in effect challenging the State at
every point to: "Prove it!"
14 9
148. 425 U.S. 391, 417 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 112 (1970) (Black, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
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